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ABSTRACT
Large quantities of data are produced and collected by computing and communication
devices in cyber-physical systems. Information extracted from these data opens new
possibilities but also raises privacy issues.
The characteristics of these data play an important role in the efficiency of privacy-
enhancing technologies thus grasping the former’s influence is a step forward in im-
proving the latter. Privacy-enhanced data can be employed in cyber-physical systems’
applications and their utility can be improved by fine-tuning the parameters of the
privacy-enhancing technologies applied to the data. This can be coupled with an anal-
ysis of the efficiency of applications that employ privacy-enhanced preprocessed data
for better insights on the trade-off between applications’ utility and data privacy. Or-
thogonal to this, privacy-enhanced data originating from cyber-physical systems can be
employed in monitoring solutions for cyber security. This is a step forward in fulfilling
both the confidentiality and privacy requirements for these complex systems.
This thesis focuses on privacy in the context of the Advanced Metering Infrastruc-
ture (AMI) in the smart electrical grid and it has three primary objectives. The first
is to study the characteristics of AMI datasets and how they influence the efficiency
of privacy-enhancing technologies. The second objective is to identify methods and
efficient algorithmic implementations, in connection to what can be deployed in con-
temporary hardware, as needed for Internet of Things-based systems. The third objec-
tive is to study the balance between confidentiality requirements and the requirement
to monitor the communication network for intrusion detection, as an example.
This thesis advances the current research by showing (i) how different AMI privacy-
enhancing techniques complement each other, (ii) how datasets’ characteristics can be
tuned in order to improve the efficiency of these techniques and (iii) how the need for
privacy can be balanced with the need to monitor the AMI communication network.
Keywords: Advanced Metering Infrastructure, data privacy, data characteristics, applied differ-
ential privacy, communication security, system security, intrusion detection.
ii
To my lovely daughter Smaranda and my dear wife Simona
iv
Acknowledgments
First, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Marina Papatriantafilou and
Dr. Magnus Almgren for their constant guidance, encouragement and understanding through-
out my work leading to this thesis. My work has been partially supported by the European
Comission Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) through the FP7-SEC-285477-
CRISALIS project and the collaboration framework of Chalmers Energy Area of Advance.
Special thanks go to Iosif and Thomas, for all the discussions, fun and support in the five
(looong :) ) years we shared an office together. I also would like to give my appreciation
to the current and former members of the Networks and Systems division for the wonderful
and friendly working environment. Thank you Adones, Ali, Anders, Amir, Aras, Aljoscha,
Andreas, Babis, Bapi, Bei, Beshr, Boel, Carlo, Christos, Daniel, Elad, Elena P., Erland, Farnaz,
Georgios, Hannah, Ioannis, Ivan, Joris, Katerina, Mustafa, Nasser, Nhan, Olaf, Oscar, Paul,
Peter L., Philippas, Pierre, Thomas R., Tomas, Valentin P., Viktor, Vincenzo, Wissam and Zhang.
Thank you for all the discussions, support and feedback you have provided so far. I would also
like to thank Anneli, Eva, Jonna, Marianne, Peter H., Rolf, Rebecca and Tiina for their great
administrative support.
I would like also to thank all the people that made Göteborg a sunnier place: Alin, Amrish,
Andy, Claudia, Costel, Cristina, Daniel Ch., Daniel Ci., Elena B., Irina, Laurent¸iu, Lavinia,
Maria, Mihai B., Mihai C., Oana, Rocio, Ruxandra, Vasiliki, Vlad. Thank you all for all the
great time!
Last, but not least, I would like to thank my family for their constant encouragement, support
and understanding over all these years — Vã mult¸umesc pentru tot!
My greatest thanks go to my lovely daughter Smaranda and my lovely wife Simona, for their
endless love and support. Thank you, I could not have accomplished this without you!
Valentin Tudor
Göteborg, October 2017
v
vi
List of Appended Papers
Paper I. Valentin Tudor, Magnus Almgren, Marina Papatriantafilou,
“The Influence of Dataset Characteristics on Privacy Preserving Methods in Ad-
vanced Metering Infrastructure”, under submission, preliminary results presented in
publications V and VI (please see next page).
Paper II. Valentin Tudor, Vincenzo Gulisano, Magnus Almgren, Marina Papatriantafilou,
“BES: Differentially Private Event Aggregation for large-scale IoT-based Systems”,
under submission, preliminary results presented in publication VII (please see next
page).
Paper III. Valentin Tudor, Magnus Almgren, Marina Papatriantafilou,
“Employing Private Data in AMI Applications: Short Term Load Forecasting Using
Differentially Private Aggregated Data”, in Advanced and Trusted Computing, 2016
Intl. IEEE Conference, Toulouse, France, July 18—21, 2016 pp. 404—413.
Paper IV. Valentin Tudor, Magnus Almgren, Marina Papatriantafilou,
“Harnessing the Unknown in Advanced Metering Infrastructure Traffic”, in Pro-
ceedings of the 30th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium On Applied Computing (SAC 2015),
Salamanca, Spain, April 13—17, 2015, pp. 2204—2211.
vii
Other publications related to, but not included in the thesis:
Paper V. Valentin Tudor, Magnus Almgren, Marina Papatriantafilou,
“Analysis of the Impact of Data Granularity on Privacy for the Smart Grid”, in Pro-
ceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on privacy in the electronic society (WPES
2013), Berlin, Germany, November 4, 2013, pp. 61—70.
Paper VI. Valentin Tudor, Magnus Almgren, Marina Papatriantafilou,
“A Study on Data De-pseudonymization in the Smart Grid”, in Proceedings of the
eighth European Workshop on Systems Security (EuroSec 2015), Bordeaux, France,
April 21, 2015, Article No. 2.
Paper VII. Vincenzo Gulisano, Valentin Tudor, Magnus Almgren, Marina Papatriantafilou,
“BES: Differentially Private and Distributed Event Aggregation in Advanced Me-
tering Infrastructures”, in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International Workshop on
Cyber-Physical System Security (CPSS 2016), Xi’an, China, May 30, 2016, pp. 59—
69.
Paper VIII. Mihai Costache, Valentin Tudor, Magnus Almgren, Marina Papatriantafilou,
“Remote Control of Smart Meters: Friend or Foe?”, in Computer Network Defense
(EC2ND), 2011 Seventh European Conference on, Gothenburg, Sweden, September
6, pp. 49—56.
viii
List of Acronyms
AMI advanced metering infrastructure
COSEM companion specification for energy metering
CPS cyber-physical system
DLMS device language message specification
DoS denial of service
DDoS distributed denial of service
DSO distribution system operator
DP differential privacy
ECR encrypted command recognition
GDPR general data protection regulation
HF high-frequency
ID identity
IDS intrusion detection system
IoT Internet of Things
kWh kilowatt hour
LF low-frequency
M-Bus meter-bus
MAPE mean absolute percentage error
NILM nonintrusive load monitoring
PCA principal component analysis
PET privacy enhancing technology
PII personally identifiable information
RQ research question
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition
STLF short term load forecasting
SG smart grid
SM smart meter
ix
x
Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgments v
List of Appended Papers vii
List of Acronyms ix
I Introduction 1
1 Overview 3
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Background, challenges and related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 The smart electrical grid and the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
- the challenges of large data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Large datasets - privacy issues, solutions and applications . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Challenges in monitoring critical infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Research methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Thesis contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.6 Summary of appended research articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6.1 Paper I: The Influence of Dataset Characteristics on Privacy Preserving
Methods in Advanced Metering Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6.2 Paper II: BES: Differentially Private Event Aggregation for large-scale
IoT-based Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
xi
1.6.3 Paper III: Employing Private Data in AMI Applications:
Short Term Load Forecasting Using Differentially Private Aggregated
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6.4 Paper IV: Harnessing the Unknown in Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.7 Conclusion and future research directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
II Strengths and Limitations of Privacy Enhancing Solutions
for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure 37
2 Paper I: The Influence of Dataset Characteristics on Privacy Preserving Methods
in Advanced Metering Infrastructure 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 Background on data and privacy in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure . . . . 43
2.2.1 Collecting data from the Advanced Metering Infrastructure . . . . . . . 44
2.2.2 Data usage and need for privacy in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure 45
2.2.3 Overview of smart grid privacy mechanisms in the literature . . . . . . . 46
2.2.4 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3 Advanced Metering Infrastructure data characteristics and problem formulation . 49
2.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.1 Formal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.2 Adversarial strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5 Probabilistic framework and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5.1 Probabilistic framework for Stage I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5.2 Probabilistic model for Stage II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.6 Estimation and evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.6.1 Description of the dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.6.2 The Poisson distribution assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.6.3 Feature selection for Stage II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.6.4 Estimation based on the probabilistic framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.6.5 Results of the execution of Algorithms 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.7 Discussion of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.7.1 Stage I: de-anonymization - discussion of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.7.2 Stage II: de-pseudonymization - discussion of results . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
xii
III Large scale Privacy Preserving Methods and Applications
for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure 79
3 Paper II: BES: Differentially Private Event Aggregation for large-scale IoT-based
Systems 83
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 System model and problem description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2.1 System Model and Streaming Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2.2 Differential Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.3 Privacy issues - why AMI data anonymization alone is not enough . . . . 89
3.3 The bounding mechanism: privacy and utility trade-offs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.3.1 The bounding mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.3.2 Privacy and utility trade-offs in Bes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.3.3 Choosing differentially private bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.4 Computing differentially private sums in a streaming fashion . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4.1 Streaming aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4.2 Relation between aggregation parameters and utility in Bes . . . . . . . 96
3.4.3 Algorithmic Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5 Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5.1 Utility Maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.5.2 Processing throughput and latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.5.3 Protecting against de-pseudonymization -
employing DP-aggregated data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4 Paper III: Employing Private Data in AMI Applications: Short Term Load Fore-
casting Using Differentially Private Aggregated Data 125
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.2.1 The smart grid and the need for short-term load forecasting . . . . . . . 128
4.2.2 The need for privacy in the smart grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.2.3 Differential Privacy overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.3 Privacy Enhanced Application Assessment Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.4 Use case: enhancing STLF with privacy enhancing technology . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.5 Qualitative privacy assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.6 Identifying and choosing appropriate privacy enhancing technologies . . . . . . 136
xiii
4.6.1 Differentially private aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.6.2 Specific STLF Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.7 Experimental Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.7.1 Description and list of experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.7.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.7.3 Discussion of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.8 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
IV Challenges and Solutions for Securing the Advanced Meter-
ing Infrastructure while Preserving Privacy 151
5 Paper IV: Harnessing the Unknown in Advanced Metering Infrastructure Traffic 155
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.2 The Advanced Metering Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.2.1 The AMI and its devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.2.2 AMI communication protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.2.3 The threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.3.1 Basic TCP session features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.3.2 Additional fine-grained features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.3.3 The classification method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.4 Experimental study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.4.1 Experiment setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.4.2 Running the classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.5 Analysis of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.5.1 Experiment 1: using individual features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.5.2 Experiment 2: using combined features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.5.3 Further analysis of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.5.4 Main findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.6 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
xiv
List of Figures
1.1 The research directions applied to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure envi-
ronment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 Advanced Metering Infrastructure datasets’ characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 An Encrypted Command Recognition Sensor as an AMI IDS module . . . . . . 21
2.1 Characteristics of AMI data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2 Creating low-frequency (L) and high-frequency (H) datasets . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3 Adversarial strategy - the two stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Stage I - Fraction of unique smart meters - seven months of data . . . . . . . . 63
2.5 Stage I - Fraction of unique smart meters - 30 days of data . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.6 Stage II - De-pseudonymization ratio for different combinations of features. . . 68
3.1 System model, composed by Smart Meters, Meter Concentrator Units and a
centralized Data Collector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 Aggregation of a stream of hourly energy consumption readings reported by
two smart meters (SM) example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 Execution of Bes for a stream of hourly energy consumption readings reported
by two SMs example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4 Evaluation - Utility maximization experiments - influence of parameter B . . . 102
3.5 Evaluation - Utility maximization experiments - influence of parameters WS
and WA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.6 Throughput and latency evolution for query Q6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.7 Re-identification results for 1,000 smart meters - WS = 24 hours . . . . . . . . 108
3.8 Re-identification results for 1,000 smart meters - WS = 168 hours . . . . . . . 109
3.9 Re-identification results for 1,000 smart meters - WS = 720 hours . . . . . . . 110
3.10 Privacy gain vs accuracy degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
xv
4.1 AMI data utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.2 Forecasting scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.3 PM and DPPM: Average MAPE (100 tests/day and 60 predicted days) for Per-
sistent Method, 24h forecast horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.4 LR1 and DPLR1: Average MAPE (100 tests/day and 60 predicted days) for
Linear Regression model 1 with DP aggregated data, 24h forecast horizon . . . 142
4.5 LR2 and DPLR2: Average MAPE (100 tests/day and 60 predicted days) for
Linear Regression model 2 with DP aggregated data, 24h forecast horizon . . . 143
5.1 The ECR sensor in an AMI IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.2 The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Data Communication Network . 158
5.3 Detection rate of M-Bus commands using kNN (k=1) on combined features
pre-processed with PCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.4 Detection rate of DLMS commands using kNN (k=1) on combined features
pre-processed with PCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
xvi
Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1
Overview
Nowadays, large quantities of data are produced every minute [47] with the help of devices
connected to the Internet. Through their analysis, these large quantities of data can offer superior
understanding of the sectors where they are collected from, but this comes at a cost: “with big
data comes great responsibility” [49]. The information that can be extracted from these data
raises privacy and ethical concerns [12] which need to be addressed and alleviated in the data
collection process in order to minimize their impact on the data producers.
1.1 Motivation
Different sectors of our society are penetrated by interconnected lightweight devices which mon-
itor and control different aspects of our lives. All these devices form what is called Internet of
Things (IoT) [2], but the systems that the devices support are also commonly known as smart
environments [21], cyber-physical systems [61] or Industry 4.0 (Industrie 4.0) [50], depending
on their capabilities and the specific locations where they operate. The estimation is that by
2020 there will be around 20 billion IoT devices installed, a big portion being comprised of
consumer products.1 Internet of Things devices slowly appear in locations and near equipment
that were traditionally disconnected from the Internet. For example, the automotive industry is
promoting interconnected vehicles, and it is envisioned that Internet connected cars will become
standard in the future [41]. In the energy sector, cyber-physical systems bring advantages to
the process of monitoring the production and delivery of energy, provide easier integration of
1http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317
3
local renewable energy sources [81], and allow for a better management of the balance between
energy production and consumption. Internet of Things devices transform residences into smart
homes [19], improving comfort and making the dwellers more informed about their electrical
energy consumption patterns and helping to reduce their environmental footprint.
All these improvements and benefits come at a cost, as the large quantities of data collected
by IoT devices raise privacy concerns due to the sensitive information that can be inferred from
them. Historically, the medical domain is one of the most privacy sensitive, as patients’ data
need to be stored and processed following strict procedures [74]. With the introduction of med-
ical IoT devices and sensors, patients can be monitored in real-time, improving the health care
quality [27], but resulting data need to be collected, transmitted, stored and processed in a se-
cure and privacy-preserving fashion [80]. Similar concerns exist also in the vehicular sector,
as data produced and collected in vehicles can be used to infer sensitive information regard-
ing the users’ driving style and their whereabouts [93]. Data collected in the electrical energy
network also raises privacy concerns, as information regarding the customers’ lifestyles can be
extracted from the energy consumption patterns [69]. These are only a few examples, but they
stress the importance of understanding, studying and overcoming the privacy challenges [38]
raised by large data generated in the Internet of Things. Closely connected to the need for pri-
vacy is the one to secure and monitor the IoT devices and ensure their correct behavior as their
Internet connectivity makes them vulnerable and susceptible to malicious utilization.2 Devices
deployed in cyber-physical systems control infrastructures which are critical for the functioning
of our society and their failure or malicious utilization may affect the environment and human
lives [37, 68, 77]. This emphasizes the need for monitoring solutions tailored to the special char-
acteristics of the IoT environment in order to benefit the most from what the IoT devices have to
offer [44, 72, 102] and to detect possible misbehavior [101] in the communication network [14].
Besides the individual privacy and security challenges [38] of IoT environments, additional chal-
lenges arise when these two requirements are put together. One of these challenges relates to
the need to monitor devices that employ encryption in their communication as a confidentiality
and privacy measure. In this case the monitoring solutions need to attune the security and the
privacy requirements, and this becomes possible by harnessing the information extracted from
IoT environments [7].
2https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/source-code-for-iot-botnet-
mirai-released/
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The work presented in this thesis is motivated by:
• The privacy concerns raised by the large quantities of data collected in different Internet
of Things environments.
• The need and the benefit of employing these data in practical applications while preserv-
ing the privacy of the data producers.
• The need to balance the privacy of the data producers with monitoring the behavior of the
devices that collect these data.
We focus on a specific Internet of Things environment, a section of the electrical grid called
the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), which exhibits the aforementioned privacy and se-
curity challenges. We formulate research questions, identify problems and propose and evaluate
solutions for the AMI. Due to the similarities in the data producing process, monitoring equip-
ment and privacy related solutions for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure are many times
applicable to other IoT environments.
The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes general
aspects of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure, outlines privacy issues of large scale AMI data
collection together with challenges of employing them in practical AMI applications and also the
requirement of balancing the need for privacy with the need to monitor the behavior of the AMI
devices. In Section 1.3 we formulate our research questions, Section 1.4 contains an overview of
our methodology and we present the main contributions of this thesis in Section 1.5. Section 1.6
contains the summary of the appended publications, and we present our conclusions, followed
by future research directions in Section 1.7. Parts II, III and IV contain the research articles
which present in detail the contributions and results of this thesis.
1.2 Background, challenges and related work
1.2.1 The smart electrical grid and the Advanced Metering Infra-
structure (AMI) - the challenges of large data
With the deployment of the Internet of Things, the electrical grid is transitioning to the so-called
smart [electrical] grid [97]. The European Commission Directorate General for Research de-
fines smart grids as “electricity networks that can intelligently integrate the behavior and actions
of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to efficiently
deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies” [97]. The objective of the smart
grid is to enhance the classical electric network through IoT devices installed in key locations.
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The European Commission portal3 offers an overview of the undergoing smart grid projects in
the European Union.
The electrical grid is divided in three main sections: the generation section (where electric-
ity is produced in power plants), the transmission section (electricity is transported over high-
voltage lines) and the distribution section (electricity is delivered to the consumers). The first
two sections already benefited from automated monitoring and control systems, while the last
one is currently undergoing the upgrade process. The generation and transmission sections are
monitored and managed by the Supervisory Control and Data Aquisition (SCADA) system, a
type of industrial control system. The concept of SCADA predates the smart grid one, but it is
continuously upgraded with the help of new IoT devices and by transitioning from the traditional
legacy systems to new ones based on commercial equipment and operating systems [53].
In the distribution section of the electrical grid, the classical electrical energy meters are
replaced with new ones, called smart meters [20]. A smart meter (SM) provides two-way com-
munication with the central system allowing efficient monitoring and control of the electricity
delivery process. Smart meters facilitate the data collection process which provides the system
operator with an important source of information. These devices, together with the communi-
cation network connecting them, form the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [13]. The
AMI concept is relatively new and it brings together elements from electrical engineering and in-
formation technology. While in some countries the upgrade of the distribution network is almost
complete, in others the AMI deployments are in different stages, depending on the local rules,
regulations and technical implementations [94]. As a component of the electrical network, the
Advanced Metering Infrastructure becomes a critical asset of out society. Studying its properties
and particularities, finding solutions for its inherent problems and developing tools for the AMI
becomes extremely important from both a research and a practical perspective.
Large datasets - multiple possibilities: Similar to the Internet of Things, the prognosis is
that data produced by smart grid equipment will be considerable and the size of the smart grid
may become larger than the size of the current Internet.4 These data will play a key role in
the development of the smart grid, and analyzing and building applications on these data will
contribute towards improving electrical grid stability. Data collected in the Advanced Metering
Infrastructure will provide, among others, better management of the electrical energy consump-
tion and the integration of renewable energy sources [90]. Some of these improvements are
closely related to other developing IoT areas. For example, these data will facilitate a close in-
teraction with the vehicular domain, as electrical vehicles will have an active role in the electrical
grid as energy sources during peak periods [24, 91].
3http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/files/u24/
2014/project_maps_28_april_2014.html
4http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10241102-54.html
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As previously mentioned, the Advanced Metering Infrastructure is composed of smart me-
ters, i.e. devices that have two-way communication capabilities with a central system. Smart
meters are capable of providing fine-grained data regarding the electrical energy consumed at
the household level and the quality of electrical power delivered [13]. The electrical energy
consumed by the household is measured using the kWh unit of energy. The billing is usually
done over long periods of time (i.e. 1-3 months), but the fine-grained energy consumption data
can also be used for differential tariffs or even for customer re-imbursements when renewable
energy is produced locally [90]. Information regarding instantaneous values of voltage, current,
active and reactive power are used for grid operation purposes and they can be very useful for
a low-voltage SCADA system [83], especially when managing local renewable energy sources.
Grid operational data need to be collected very often (i.e. less than a minute) in order to give
an accurate overview of the electrical distribution network. Efthymiou and Kalogridis [30] use
the term high-frequency (HF) data for data which are used mainly for grid operational purposes
and low-frequency (LF) data for data used mainly for billing purposes. We will keep the same
definitions for these two types of data throughout this thesis.
The work in this thesis is focused on data produced and collected in the Advanced Metering
Infrastructure. Information from AMI data can be harnessed with the help of cloud process-
ing [66, 88], and after a thorough data validation process [46], will allow for the development
of a number of AMI applications such as peak energy consumption shaving [40], short-term
energy consumption forecast [92], prevention of energy-related fraud [16, 70], securing critical
infrastructures [6, 44, 45] and also educating the consumers towards efficient energy usage [71].
1.2.2 Large datasets - privacy issues, solutions and applications
As mentioned in Section 1.1, large quantities of data collected in the Internet of Things can raise
privacy concerns, especially when a person is behind the data production process. This also
applies to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure environment where energy consumption data
can be used to infer information about the lifestyle of people living at the premises. Peoples’
privacy can be preserved with the help of privacy enhancing technologies (PET:s) tailored to the
AMI environment.
Data recorded and reported by the smart meters can contain sensitive information such as
electrical equipment usage patterns [78], presence or absence from the premises [69] or even the
channel displayed on the TV set [43]. With the help of a technique called Nonintrusive Load
Monitoring [48] the type of the electrical appliances installed at premises may be inferred and
this process is simplified by AMI data collected with high granularity [31]. The energy load
profiles become distinctive biometric behavioral traits [8] and can be used to identify individuals
or group of persons based on their energy consumption patterns.
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Privacy-enhancing technologies for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
The examples above show some of the privacy concerns raised by data collected in the Advanced
Metering Infrastructure. Thus, preserving data producers’ privacy is an important goal and em-
ploying PET:s in the AMI environment can help to achieve it. Before presenting the main PET:s
for AMI we briefly mention the legal framework covering the smart metering data. At the time
of writing, there is no enforced European Directive that covers smart metering data in particu-
lar and this type of data falls under the general incidence of the EU Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC [25]. The EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC is being replaced by the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [35], whose enforcement for all EU entities will take place
on 25th of May 2018. As a consequence, until the enforcement of GDPR, deployment of the
Advanced Metering Infrastructure can be significantly slowed down in countries where privacy
preservation of AMI data is not guaranteed by law [23]. Article 35 of the GDPR which refers
to Privacy by Design will become the legal requirement for implementing Privacy Enhancing
Technologies in all domains, including the process of developing and improving the smart grid.
The EU Commission also provides a Data Protection Impact Assessment Template for Smart
Grid and Smart Metering Systems [34] whose scope is “[...] to help ensure the fundamental
rights to protection of personal data and to privacy in the deployment of smart grid applications
and systems and smart metering roll-out [...]” [34]. In addition, the EU Smart Grid Task Force5
offers documentation containing guidance on data protection and privacy for smart grid investors
and data controllers6.
There are a number of surveys that cover the privacy enhancing technologies proposed for
the Advanced Metering Infrastructure [10, 56, 87]. Generally, there are two main types of PET:s
for AMI: techniques that operate on the personally identifiable information (PII) attached to the
energy data (i.e. data anonymization, data pseudonymization) and techniques that operate on
the energy consumption data (i.e. data aggregation, data obfuscation, verifiable computation).
Combinations of these technologies are also possible for additional enhancing of data’ privacy.
Data anonymization and usage of pseudonyms: We return to the two types of AMI data pre-
sented earlier: high-frequency (HF) data used for grid operational purposes and low-frequency
(LF) data used for billing. Efthymiou and Kalogridis [30] consider billing data to be privacy
neutral, as they are seldom collected (LF data), thus showing overall information about the en-
ergy consumption process over the time period considered. Also, for a correct billing, these
data need to be attributable to a specific customer. On the other hand, grid operational data
need to be collected often (HF data), thus they might show detailed information about the cus-
5http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/smart-
grids-and-meters
6https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_dpia_
smart_grids_forces.pdf
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tomer’s lifestyle. For privacy reasons, the connection to the real identity of these data needs to
be severed. This can be accomplished with the help of third party entities which are responsible
of collecting, anonymizing and then delivering the sensitive data to its beneficiary [9, 30, 98].
Borges et al. [11] propose a similar solution based on anonymity networks where a customer
uses different identities for transmitting the billing and grid-operational data. Rottondi et al. [84]
propose a pseudonymization protocol which relies on a secret sharing scheme, enabling a set of
nodes in the network to perform pseudonymization without having access to the measurements
themselves. The protocol also provides a Identity Recovery phase which can be performed in
case of alarms or faults, which can be used to connect a pseudonym with the real identity of the
data producer.
Data aggregation and obfuscation: These methods can employ simple aggregation, when
the values are aggregated together, or data can be obfuscated with the help of noise addition. Ho-
momorphic cryptography methods can be employed to provide an extra layer of privacy for the
aggregated values [63, 69, 99] and they can also be combined with noisy aggregation [63]. Bohli
et al. [9] propose a solution where each meter adds a random value extracted from a known dis-
tribution to each of its reported consumption values. If enough smart meters participate, then the
energy provider which knows the parameters of the distribution can compute the (approximated)
aggregated consumption. Methods based on differential privacy [29] where noise extracted from
a Laplacian distribution is added to the aggregated consumption were also proposed for the Ad-
vanced Metering Infrastructure environment. Barthe et al. [3] propose a protocol which is able
to aggregate smart meter readings into statistics and bills in a privacy-friendly fashion. Ács and
Castelluccia [1] present a similar solution, relying on a different distributed noise generation
method. Shi et al. [86] propose a solution where homomorphic encryption is integrated with
differential privacy to prevent untrusted aggregators from gaining knowledge from the partic-
ipant’s data. Rottondi et al. [85] propose a technique inspired from differential privacy and
multiparty computation which is based on white noise addition. There are also methods that
provide obfuscation via technical means [59, 60], but they are outside the scope of this thesis.
Limitations of privacy-enhancing technologies for the Advanced Metering Infra-
structure
Recent studies showed that through adversarial means, the effect of privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure can be diminished. Jawurek et al. [55] present the
problem of breaking smart meter privacy by employing a technique called de-pseudonymization.
They rely on support vector machines and present procedures that can be employed to link con-
sumption traces by correlating anomalies that happen at the same time (such as consumption
spikes or blackouts) or by finding similar customer behaviors in different consumption traces.
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Buchmann et al. [15] show that with the help of simple statistical tools such as mean and standard
deviation, individual houses can be identified based on their energy consumption records. Eibl
and Engel [31] describe how a characteristic of AMI data, called data granularity can influence
the efficiency of detection methods employed in nonintrusive load monitoring algorithms [48],
thus diminishing the effect of privacy-enhancing methods that hide appliance consumption pat-
terns. Faisal et al. [36] show how data granularity and the quantity of collected data affects the
re-identification efficiency. Their results show that even very low sampling consumption traces
(two samples per year) can still be viable to re-identify customers with an accuracy of 20%.
Studying the characteristics of the AMI data and especially how they influence the efficiency
of the privacy-preserving methods will help the improvement of these methods, the efficient
collection of AMI data and also the development of privacy-preserving smart grid services. We
further describe this problem and our research contribution in Research Question 1 (RQ1).
Enhancing the utility of privacy-enhanced data in practical applications
Aggregation and obfuscation solutions are successful in preserving the privacy of the customers
involved, but depending on how they are performed, some important information might be lost,
thus narrowing the applications where resulting data can be used. In Section 1.2.2 we pre-
sented some of the applications where data produced in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
can be employed. Some of these applications require data which is unaltered and identifiable
with the real identity of the customer who produced it, while others can employ data that un-
dergoes privacy-enhancing processing. Due to privacy issues many applications are enhanced
and become privacy-preserving. Applications which employ obfuscated Advanced Metering
Infrastructure data may suffer a loss in accuracy caused by the extra noise introduced by the
privacy-enhancing methods employed. Limiting the accuracy loss while maintaining the cus-
tomers’ privacy is an interesting investigation venue.
Erkin and Veugen [32] indicate that AMI data collected for management purposes can also
be used by third parties and propose solutions to provide new personalized services for smart
homes while protecting the privacy-sensitive data. Gong et al. [42] propose a privacy-preserving
scheme for demand-response programs which also enables rewarding customers for reducing
their load during demand peaks. In the following we focus on obfuscation methods based on
differential privacy [29]. Ács and Castelluccia [1] propose an aggregation method based on
differential privacy which can hinder the adversary’s ability to infer customers’ activity during
a specific period of time. Their results show that the application’s utility increases together
with the number of participating customers. Barthe et al. [3] propose and evaluate a distributed
solution that can be used to aggregate smart meter readings into statistics and bills, but no ex-
periments based on real data are provided. Jelasity and Birman [57] assume the existence of a
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bound in order to limit the global sensitivity of the aggregation and discuss a method to prevent
differentially private queries run continuously over time from enabling the adversary to learn
the readings’ underlying distribution. Bounding the global sensitivity may reduce the quantity
of noise added, which will improve the utility of aggregation. We further describe the utility
enhancing challenge and our research contribution in Research Question 2 (RQ2).
1.2.3 Challenges in monitoring critical infrastructures
In addition to their benefits, Internet of Things devices also raise cyber security challenges.
By exploiting their vulnerabilities, IoT devices can become part of a botnet and used in large-
scale network attacks.7 This becomes even more dangerous when these devices are part of
critical infrastructures which control physical processes. Equipment malfunction and malicious
activities need to be detected early by monitoring IoT devices and their communication network.
In recent years, the integration of commercial off-the-shelf solutions in critical infrastruc-
tures enabled cyber-attacks which can be carried out in the same way as in classical IT sys-
tems [72]. One of the attack techniques that were recently employed was that of malware tai-
lored for these types of systems. Stuxnet [79], Duqu [4] and Flame (sKyWIper) [64] are relevant
examples of ICS related malware discovered recently and their complexity shows the amount
of resources and effort that was put in their development. These pieces of malware, together
with a recent proof-of-concept called Irongate [52] show that some adversaries are willing to
allocate significantly more resources compared with many examples of malware for classical
systems [33]. Two recent attacks, one against a power station8 and one against a public heating
system9 give a glimpse of the effects of these attacks on critical infrastructures.
The research community is actively working towards identifying and mitigating vulnera-
bilities that affect critical infrastructures such as the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).
Carpenter et al. [18] present a number of vulnerabilities that exist in devices in the AMI together
with an attack methodology. Subsequently, Foreman and Gurugubelli [39] present the attack sur-
face of the AMI with respect to hardware and network configurations, protocols, and software.
McLaughlin et al. [73] and Grochocki et al. [44] describe possible attack scenarios for the Ad-
vanced Metering Infrastructure, starting from potential attacker goals covering denial of service,
energy fraud, and even targeted disconnect of electrical services. Distributed denial of service
(DDoS) against a power station [77] might affect the control equipment and the energy supply
in the area served by the targeted power station. Smart meters can be tampered with to report a
lower energy consumption in order to lower the electricity bill, thus committing fraud. A fraud
7https://www.wired.com/2016/12/botnet-broke-internet-isnt-going-away/
8https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-
ukraines-power-grid/
9https://thehackernews.com/2016/11/heating-system-hacked.html
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case involving a large number of smart meters, which may have cost the utility several hundreds
of millions of dollars was reported in Puerto Rico [62]. A similar case occurred in Malta [68]
where the authorities discovered that at least 1, 000 smart meters had been tampered with, af-
fecting 10% of the total local generation of electricity and causing a loss of approximately $41
million in 2012 alone. Abusing the smart meters’ remote disconnect feature [22] may influence
the power quality, leading to negative effects on the devices connected to the electrical network.
These reported events and also the potential attacks described by the research community
reveal the need for monitoring solutions for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure. The moni-
toring is performed by a specialized system, called Intrusion Detection System (IDS) tailored to
the environment under observation. IDS:s [89] have three logical components: the sensors (data
collectors), the analyzers (data processors) and the user interface (presenting the information
to the operator). Depending on their location and on the type of data analyzed, the IDS:s can
be host-based (monitoring the events in a single host), network-based (monitoring the network
traffic) or distributed/hybrid (mix between host-based and network based).
Due to the large scale of the AMI environment, a distributed IDS is apparently the most
cost-effective in a long-lived deployment, according to Cárdenas et al. [17]. Zhang et al. [103]
propose a distributed architecture with multiple IDS nodes deployed at different points in the
AMI, while Grochocki et al. [44] recommend a distributed IDS model that can monitor traffic
between peers and also scales with the size of the AMI communication network. Besides moni-
toring network traffic, there is also a need to monitor devices’ internals, as some of the attacks’
manifestations may not reflect into exterior traffic. Raciti and Nadjm-Tehrani [82] present a
model for a host-based IDS which detects anomalies inside AMI devices. They build a module
based on this model and test four possible attack types against the smart meters’ internals: data
manipulation, recalibration (changing registers’ values), reset (deleting the records regarding
consumed energy) and sleep mode (the meter is put into sleep mode and the energy consumed is
not registered). If not detected in time, these attacks can cause serious economic loss.
Depending on the detection method employed, IDS:s can be signature based (detect attacks
by comparing current activity with specific patterns) or anomaly based (compare current ac-
tivity with a model of trustworthy behavior and alert for deviations) [89]. Due to the lack of
known attack signatures, Mitchell and Chen [75] stress that a behavior (anomaly) based IDS
is preferred in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure environment over a signature-based one.
Behavior models can be built with the help of large data collected in the AMI environment. As
mentioned in Section 1.2.2, AMI data undergoes privacy-enhancing processing in order to pro-
tect them against privacy invasive attacks. Therefore, network traffic between AMI devices is
usually encrypted to protect the confidentiality of the communication process and customers’
data privacy. One important source of information for behavior models comes from monitoring
the traffic between devices [51] but this process might become cumbersome, especially when
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the AMI traffic is encrypted [7]. Monitoring the AMI communication network while preserving
confidentiality and privacy becomes a major challenge in the process of developing security so-
lutions for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure environment. This shows that there is a need
to develop monitoring solutions that are also privacy preserving and the starting point for these
monitoring tools relies in the study of the large data produced in this environment. We further
describe this problem and our contribution in Research Question 3 (RQ3).
1.3 Research questions
The research presented in this thesis is based on the analysis of large quantities of data produced
in large scale environments such as large scale cyber-physical systems or Internet of Things and
we pose research questions which stem from the challenges presented in Section 1.2. Our study
has three primary objectives, filling some of the identified gaps and advancing the current state
of research. The first one is to identify relevant characteristics of the collected datasets and
study their influence on previously proposed anonymization techniques [15, 31, 36, 55]. The
second objective is to investigate how to enhance the utility of applications which employ data
that undergo privacy-enhancing technologies based on noise addition [1, 3, 57]. The third is
orthogonal to the first two and focuses on the balance between privacy requirements and the
requirement to monitor the communication network [7, 17, 75]. Next, we define and motivate
our research questions, while in the following sections we present the methodology employed
and the contributions of this thesis.
RQ1: Which dataset characteristics influence the efficiency of privacy-enhancing technologies
and what is their effect?
RQ2: How to enhance the utility of data that undergo privacy-enhancing technologies based on
addition of noise?
RQ3: How to balance the need for confidentiality and customers’ data privacy with the need to
monitor the communication network?
RQ1: Data gathered in different environments can be used to infer sensitive information
regarding the individuals that are behind the data producing process, raising privacy concerns.
In order to alleviate these concerns, privacy-enhancing technologies can be applied during the
data collection process [30]. However the efficiency of these technologies may be influenced
by properties of the data itself. Recall from Section 1.2.2 that in the Advanced Metering Infra-
structure, information about customers’ lifestyle can be inferred from fine-grained energy data
collected by smart meters [69]. We identify and investigate AMI datasets’ characteristics [36]
and how they influence privacy-enhancing techniques which were previously proposed for this
environment.
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Figure 1.1: The research directions applied to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
environment
RQ2: Large data produced in cyber-physical systems offer many advantages but they also
raise significant challenges regarding private data processing and enhancing privacy oblivious
applications. One technique that can be used to increase the resilience of these large data sets
against privacy violations such as de-anonymization and de-pseudonymization is to aggregate
individual data values with the help of privacy-enhancing technologies based on noise injec-
tion [1]. Recall from Section 1.2.2 that the quantity of injected noise can affect the utility of
these data, and might decrease the efficiency of the cyber-physical systems’ applications em-
ploying them [57]. Fine-tuning the noise addition process may improve data utility, but this
may come at a privacy cost. We investigate ways of enhancing the utility of data that undergo
privacy-enhancing technologies based on addition of noise.
RQ3: Monitoring solutions are required in order to ensure the correct behavior of CPS de-
vices. These monitoring solutions might often interfere with the privacy requirements by inspect-
ing sensitive data, hence they need to be adjusted accordingly. Please recall from Section 1.2.3
that in order to ensure confidentiality, devices in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure rely on
encryption in their network communication [5]. This makes the communication network more
resilient against malicious adversaries but at the same time reduces the monitoring capabilities
of the network operator, making it more difficult to detect any misbehaving user or equipment.
We investigate how to harmonize the privacy and confidentiality requirements with the devices’
monitoring requirements in the AMI environment [7]. This investigation is important in the con-
text of developing intrusion detection solutions for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure [6].
14
Figure 1.1 depicts the research directions applied to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
environment. In the following we present each research question in the context of the Advanced
Metering Infrastructure, where we describe the methodology employed and our contributions
1.4 Research methodology
In this section we present an overview of the methodology used in this thesis with regard to
the research questions formulated in Section 1.3. A detailed description of these methods and
their specific implementation is provided in Parts II, III and IV. Some of the methods employed
are shared (with small adaptations) between the different research questions, while others are
employed in close connection with each of the questions under study.
In our work we focus on the large quantities of data collected in the Advanced Metering
Infrastructure. In order to explore the possible answers to our research questions, we employ
methods that extract, analyze and process the useful information from the aforementioned data.
Data
Granularity
Data
Retention Time
Pseudonyms
Safe
Zone
Unsafe
Zone
Figure 1.2: Advanced Metering Infrastructure datasets’ characteristics
RQ1: Our first research question addresses the influence of dataset’s characteristics on the
efficiency of privacy-enhancing technologies [36]. Figure 1.2 (proposed by us in Paper I) depicts
three main characteristics we focus on: the usage of pseudonyms in the process of reporting/s-
toring data for the same customer, the retention time of data stored by the utility provider under
the same pseudonym for the same customer and the granularity [36] of reported/stored data. We
briefly describe them and motivate their influence on the data privacy:
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Pseudonyms: Using a pseudonym instead of the real identity is the first step in the data
anonymization process. This offers a privacy-preserving layer but the connection between the
real identity of the customer and the pseudonym needs to be kept secret. This protection can be
enhanced by increasing the number of pseudonyms used for each customer and changing them
frequently, thus shortening the period where each pseudonym is used, offering a better separation
between the real identity and the pseudonyms used.
Data retention time: A long period of stored data will help create an accurate energy con-
sumption profile, which can be used to extract sensitive information about the data producer’s
lifestyle. Shortening the data retention time or employing multiple pseudonyms over a long re-
tention period may help in enhancing the privacy of the participating customers, increasing the
difficulty of tracking them through the consumption pattern.
Data granularity: AMI data can be reported and stored under different granularities depend-
ing on their application utilization. Data used for billing needs to be reported using the exact
consumption values for accuracy and to prevent fraud, but it can be collected with a low fre-
quency, recording only the total quantity of energy consumed in a time period. High-frequency
data needs to be collected more often as some grid operation applications require a short re-
sponse time and fine-grained data. Decreasing the granularity of the data may help in improving
customers’ privacy, by hiding consumption artifacts.
We study the influence of these three characteristics on two previously proposed privacy
violation methods: de-anonymization [30] and de-pseudonymization [55]. We propose algo-
rithms describing a two-staged adversarial model which targets Advanced Metering Infrastruc-
ture datasets with the purpose of extracting sensitive information in relation to the data pro-
ducer. In each of the stages, the adversarial model employs one privacy violation method:
de-anonymization in the first stage and de-pseudonymization in the second one. For the de-
anonymization stage, we propose a framework based on probabilistic analysis (bins and balls) [76]
which assumes a specific distribution (Poisson) of the customers’ energy consumption values.
Based on the uniqueness of these values and using the probabilistic tools available for the bins
and balls problem [76] we estimate the expected number of customers that can be de-anonymized
by employing the adversarial strategy. For the de-pseudonymization stage, we estimate the ex-
pected number of customers that can be identified by randomly matching the pseudonyms use
for storing customers’ data. In addition to the probabilistic frameworks we perform a practical
experimental evaluation of the adversarial capabilities with the help of a dataset consisting of
smart meter readings from a large number of consumers in a medium-sized city. The data has
undergone a sanitization process where a number of data collection artifacts has been removed,
such as gaps in reporting, double conflicting records or decreasing consumption indexes.
RQ2: The second research question focuses on privacy-enhancing technologies which add
noise to sensitive values in order to protect them against privacy invasive adversaries. We fo-
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cus on differential privacy [28, 29], a state of the art privacy-enhancing noise addition method
which offers probabilistic guarantees on the privacy leaks of individual values when a statistical
result is released. Following the original definition of differentially private [29] and building
on previously proposed solutions for the AMI environment [1], the noise drawn from a Lapla-
cian distribution is proportional to the sensitivity of the function (given by the highest possible
contributing value) employed in the release mechanism. In the case of differentially private ag-
gregation of real values, the quantity of noise can be very large if the sensitivity is not bounded,
which reduces the utility of the aggregation result [57]. We analyze the bounding mechanism,
we propose applied practical methods which can be used to compute bounds and we investigate
their impact on the privacy of AMI customers. In addition to the bounded sensitivity we eval-
uate how other data collection parameters can be fine-tuned in order to maximize data utility,
by minimizing the mean absolute percentage error [1] between the differentially private and the
simple aggregation.
We build on the adversarial model employed in RQ1 [95] and we investigate the complemen-
tary protection offered by differentially private aggregation when combined with other privacy-
enhancing technologies, such as anonymization. We run an evaluation on a fine-grained AMI
energy consumption dataset in order to evaluate how differentially private bounded aggregation
reduces the adversarial efficiency in performing de-anonymization attacks and what is the effect
on the utility of the aggregated statistic. Furthermore, we study how data that undergo privacy-
enhancing technologies based on noise injection (differential privacy) can be employed in practi-
cal Advanced Metering Infrastructure applications such as short-term load forecasting [54]. We
propose a framework that can be used to enhance an AMI application with the help of differen-
tially private aggregated data and to evaluate the effect of this enhancement on the application’s
efficiency [96].
RQ3: Our third research question addresses the capacity of monitoring solutions for the
Advanced Metering Infrastructure communication network to handle encrypted communication
without affecting the data privacy. Employing encryption makes the communication network
more resilient against malicious adversaries but at the same time reduces the monitoring ca-
pabilities of the network operator, making it more difficult to detect any misbehaving user or
equipment [7]. We start from a previously proposed command recognition methodology [51]
and we refine and adapt it to the AMI environment. We analyze the properties of the AMI com-
munication network and we identify features [65] that characterize the communication protocols
used. In the feature selection process we analyze and motivate the relevance of each individual
feature for the problem considered. The selected features reflect aspects related to commands’
timing and duration, making them applicable also to other IoT protocols. We employ supervised
learning and we propose an AMI command classifier based on k-nearest-neighbor algorithm,
a fast and accurate solution for the problem at hand [100]. We evaluate the efficiency of our
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classifier on two Advanced Metering Infrastructure protocols currently used in EU AMI deploy-
ments. One of the protocols, called DLMS/COSEM [26], uses encrypted communication while
the other, called M-BUS [67], is difficult to parse due to its proprietary implementation. In our
evaluation we assess the efficiency of both individual and combined features, while for the com-
bination we also apply dimensionality reduction [58] and analyze its effect on the classification
method. In our analysis we also cover the case of commands that can only be differentiated based
on their payload, which circumvents the privacy requirement of our solution and we investigate
solutions for this special case taking into account the commands’ impact on security.
1.5 Thesis contributions
In this section we present an overview of the contributions of this thesis, with regard to the
research questions formulated in Section 1.3. We start by enumerating the main contributions,
followed by a short summary. A full description of these contributions is provided in Parts II, III
and IV.
Main contributions and advancement on existing research:
RQ1: Advanced Metering Infrastructure data characteristics and anonymization efficiency
• We study the effects of AMI dataset characteristics (data granularity [36], retention
time, usage of pseudonyms) on two privacy violation methods: de-anonymization [30]
and de-pseudonymization [55].
• We define and refine an adversary model [15, 55] and present her methodology
which covers both privacy violation methods in order to assess her limitations.
• We demonstrate both through probabilistic estimation and evaluation on a real
dataset how small changes in the data collection process [36] can scale down the
efficiency of the adversary.
RQ2: Efficient applications of differential privacy in AMI data processing
• We provide a method that can maximize the utility [57] of a differentially private
statistic by controlling its aggregation parameters, allowing for differential privacy
to be practically [1] deployed in similar cyber-physical systems such as AMI
• We provide a thorough evaluation, based on a real prototype [3] and conducted
with events collected from a real-world Advanced Metering Infrastructure, show-
ing the accuracy [57] of differentially private aggregation based on our proposed
method.
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• We present a methodology that can be employed to enhance an existing appli-
cation with data that is processed with privacy-enhancing technologies based on
noise addition [1] and qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the effect of this
enhancement on the application’s utility.
• We apply this methodology to an AMI short-term load forecasting application [54]
and we demonstrate that the error introduced by the noisy aggregated data does not
have a major effect on the accuracy of the forecast algorithms in question.
RQ3: Monitoring Advanced Metering Infrastructure devices by analyzing encrypted traffic
• We perform an analysis of the AMI communication network and its properties in
order to identify features important from a security perspective [51].
• Based on these features, we propose a methodology to identify the type of com-
mands [51] exchanged between AMI devices, which can handle proprietary and/or
encrypted AMI protocols [7].
• We provide a validation of our approach using collected traffic [7, 51] from two
testbeds using different AMI protocols currently used in EU AMI deployments.
Summary of contributions:
RQ1: We focus on two types of data that can be collected in the AMI. The first type is called
Low-Frequency (LF) data [30] and is seldom (sometimes yearly) collected and has billing as a
primary application utility. The second type is called High-Frequency (HF) data [30], which is
collected very often, and is mainly used in grid operation applications. LF data is somewhat
privacy neutral and, because of the legal implications of the billing process, needs to be iden-
tifiable with the data producer’s real identity. On the other hand, fine-grained HF data raises
privacy concerns, thus needs to be collected and stored under a pseudonym in order to preserve
the privacy of the customer that produced the data.
We identify, couple together and investigate the three data characteristics presented in Sec-
tion 1.4: the usage of pseudonyms, the retention time and the granularity. In adition, we build
upon two previously proposed privacy-enhancing methods that operate on the personal identifi-
able information (PII) stored in AMI datasets: anonymization [30] and usage of pseudonyms [84].
We advance the current state of research by defining an adversarial model comprising of two
stages, each covering a different privacy violation: de-anonymization and de-pseudonymization.
In addition to existing literature covering these privacy violations [15, 55], we propose a
probabilistic framework to better define the adversarial capabilities and methods that allow eval-
uation on large AMI datasets. In the de-pseudonymization stage HF datasets originating from
the same customer but stored under different pseudonyms are linked together using a method
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based on distances in a multi-dimensional feature space which employs features extracted from
the energy consumption data, broadening the work presented in [15]. In the de-anonymization
stage customers’ HF and LF datasets are linked using a probabilistic method [76] based on the
uniqueness of LF energy consumption values. We employ this framework and we evaluate how
changes in the data collection procedure [36] which modify the datasets’ characteristics can help
mitigate the outcome of privacy violations such as de-anonymization and de-pseudonymization.
Our findings show how tuning the aforementioned characteristics of the data collection process
can reduce the efficiency of the adversary. Our proposed methodology and results can be used
by data custodians to better understand the properties of their Advanced Metering Infrastructure
datasets and provide a foundation for developing privacy-preserving release methods.
RQ2: We focus on differential privacy [28, 29], a method which offers probabilistic guaran-
tees on the privacy leaks of individual values when a statistical result is released and we extend
the existing research on employing differential privacy in practical AMI applications [1, 3]. We
present practical solutions to one problem previously raised in the literature, that of enhanc-
ing the utility of the data by bounding the sensitivity of the release mechanism [57]. We show
the strong complementary protection offered by differentially private aggregation when com-
bined with other privacy-enhancing technologies, such as anonymization [30]. Our results show
that differentially private bounded aggregation reduces the adversarial efficiency in perform-
ing de-anonymization attacks while enhancing the utility of the aggregated statistic compared
with unbounded differentially private aggregation [95]. Our solution, based on a state-of-the-art
stream processing engine, can be efficiently deployed in environments similar to existing AMI
environments.
We contribute to the process of developing practical privacy-preserving applications for the
AMI environment [32] and we study how data that undergo privacy-enhancing technologies
based on noise injection can be employed in practical Advanced Metering Infrastructure ap-
plications. We propose a methodology that can be used to enhance an AMI application with
the help of differentially private aggregated data and to evaluate the effect of this enhancement
on the application’s efficiency. We use this methodology on an application that relies on fine-
grained AMI energy consumption data in order to compute accurate predictions of short term
energy consumption, building on and expanding the work presented in [54]. We identify differ-
ent information sources that can be employed by this application and make an analysis of their
characteristics with respect to the trade-off between application’s accuracy and their privacy im-
pact. We identify privacy neutral sources of information which enhance the accuracy and we
use them in the prediction process. We provide a quantitative evaluation in which we compare
the accuracy of a differentially private enhanced prediction application with its non-enhanced
counterpart. Our results show that there is a minor trade-off between the differentially private
aggregation privacy benefits and the loss in accuracy.
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RQ3: So far our contributions covered privacy issues and applications of privacy-enhanced
data for cyber-physical systems. Orthogonal to this, we focus on and advance the current state
of research concerning monitoring solutions for the CPS environment which need to handle en-
crypted traffic [7]. Building on the work on encrypted industrial control traffic [51], we provide
solutions in employing information extracted from encrypted AMI traffic, without affecting the
privacy of customers.
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Figure 1.3: An Encrypted Command Recognition Sensor as an AMI IDS module
We develop one essential component for an AMI Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [82],
which we call the Encrypted Command Recognition (ECR) sensor (depicted in Figure 1.3 and
proposed by us in Paper IV). The ECR sensor can accurately determine individual AMI com-
mands exchanged between AMI devices, commands relying either on an encrypted protocol or
one that is difficult to parse. The command identification is performed in a privacy-preserving
fashion, without decrypting the traffic and without accessing the sensitive customer data reported
via the AMI communication network. The command identification is performed with the help of
a classifier which employs features based on side-channel information [51] and can be applied
to both encrypted or hard to parse protocols. We also cover the special case of commands that
can only be differentiated based on their payload contents and we offer solutions for this special
case based on the commands’ impact on security.
Our main contribution to already existing research is the ECR module, which can become
an important component of a distributed Intrusion Detection System for the Advanced Meter-
ing Infrastructure environment [103]. It will help in early detection of misbehaviors and at-
tacks [7], giving the network operator a better overview on the AMI communication network’s
status, while preserving the privacy of customers’ sensitive data [69]. We expect that the features
identified for the two protocols we have studied will facilitate the study of other proprietary or
encrypted protocols employed in the IoT, while preserving the privacy of the exchanged data.
21
1.6 Summary of appended research articles
1.6.1 Paper I: The Influence of Dataset Characteristics on Privacy
Preserving Methods in Advanced Metering Infrastructure
In the first paper we investigate RQ1 in detail. We focus on previously proposed privacy-
enhancing technologies and we study how their efficiency is affected by the characteristics of
the datasets they are applied to. We present the first steps towards an analytical framework
which models a privacy-invasive adversary, a framework that can be used to estimate the effect
of the datasets’ characteristics and the conditions under which such datasets can be released to
third parties.
Our main focus is on datasets collected from the AMI environments and on two privacy
violations they are susceptible to: de-anonymization and de-pseudonymization. We start from
formalizing the process of creating low-frequency and high-frequency datasets which are em-
ployed in different Advanced Metering Infrastructure applications. Next we define an adversary
model and present her methodology for each of the two privacy violation techniques to better
understand her limitations. We propose a formalization for the two privacy violations based on a
probabilistic framework and we compare the theoretical model estimation results with evaluation
results obtained from a large dataset of energy consumption data captured in a live Advanced
Metering Infrastructure environment. Our results show how Advanced Metering Infrastructure
datasets’ characteristics (data retention time, data collection granularity and the frequent changes
of pseudonyms) can be tuned in order to mitigate the efficiency of an adversary that intends to
perform de-anonymization and de-pseudonymization.
1.6.2 Paper II: BES: Differentially Private Event Aggregation for
large-scale IoT-based Systems
In the second paper we investigate the first part of RQ2 and we focus on enhancing the utility
of previously proposed privacy-enhancing technologies for the Advanced Metering Infrastruc-
ture. We study how differential privacy, a privacy-enhancing technology offering probabilistic
guarantees, can be used to complement other technologies to allow for controlled disclosure of
statistics computed on sensitive data.
We propose methods to limit the noise introduced by differential privacy in real-world ap-
plications, by bounding the parameters of differential privacy based on information extracted
in a differentially private fashion from the system under study or from other similar systems,
thus keeping the differential privacy’s guarantees. We provide an evaluation based on a fully
implemented prototype using real-world data from the Advanced Metering Infrastructure. We
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show how a large number of events can be aggregated in a private fashion with low process-
ing latency by a single-board device, similar in performance to the devices deployed in the
Advanced Metering Infrastructure. With the help of a previously published de-anonymization
scenario (presented in Paper I), we also study the complementary protection offered by differ-
entially private aggregation when compared to other privacy-enhancing technologies. We show
that differentially private aggregation can reduce the efficiency of an adversary whose goal is to
perform de-anonymization of Advanced Metering Infrastructure datasets.
1.6.3 Paper III: Employing Private Data in AMI Applications:
Short Term Load Forecasting Using Differentially Private
Aggregated Data
In the third paper we continue the investigation of RQ1 and RQ2 and we focus on the need
to balance the privacy requirements with utility benefits in practical applications that rely on
sensitive information. More specifically we study the possibility of employing in practical ap-
plications data that undergo privacy-enhancing technologies.
We propose a methodology which can be used to analyze and enhance an Advanced Me-
tering Infrastructure application with data that was preprocessed with privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies. This methodology facilitates an analysis of privacy concerns raised by the different
sources of information that could benefit the application. We apply this methodology to Short
Term Load Forecasting, an Advanced Metering Infrastructure application that relies on sensitive
AMI data to perform accurate prediction of electrical energy consumption. We conduct an ex-
ploratory study focused on the effects of differentially-private aggregation on linear Short Term
Load Forecasting methods that can be employed in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure. We
show that the noise introduced, in the case of a bounded sensitivity, has a minor effect on the
forecast accuracy.
1.6.4 Paper IV: Harnessing the Unknown in Advanced Metering
Infrastructure Traffic
In the fourth paper we investigate RQ3 and we study how to balance the need for privacy and
confidentiality with the need to monitor the communication between devices in the Advanced
Metering Infrastructure environment. We develop a component for an Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem which can recognize the type of individual commands exchanged between Advanced Me-
tering Infrastructure devices which might employ encrypted or hard to parse communication
protocols.
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We identify a number of features which summarize Advanced Metering Infrastructure traffic
characteristics and we propose a traffic recognition methodology that employs them. We show,
for two different Advanced Metering Infrastructure protocols, that our methodology and iden-
tified traffic characteristics can be employed in order to identify a set of commands exchanged
between devices. This component can be used in an Intrusion Detection System and it is one
important source of information for building and maintaining a behavior model for each and
every device that the Advanced Metering Infrastructure is comprised of. The operator will get a
better view of the network’s status and early insights of possible attacks and misbehaviors.
1.7 Conclusion and future research directions
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) with many small devices and their communica-
tion capabilities will produce large quantities of data which can be processed and transformed
into valuable information, opening the path for new applications and improvement of the IoT
environment. The work presented in this thesis tackles three data related challenges previously
raised by the research community and focuses on one instantiation of an IoT environment, the
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), a critical infrastructure. The first challenge is to study
the characteristics of AMI datasets and their influence on the efficiency of privacy enhancing
technologies (RQ1). The second one is to enhance the utility of applications which employ
AMI data that undergo privacy-enhancing technologies based on noise addition and to better
understand the effect of the noise added (RQ2). Orthogonal to the first two, the third challenge
(RQ3) is to investigate the balance between data confidentiality and the requirement to moni-
tor the AMI communication network, with practical applications. This thesis addresses these
three challenges and proposes new methods for solving and analyzing the problems, as well as
presenting extensive experimental evaluations in real usage scenarios.
We begin our study by focusing on RQ1 where we propose a framework to analyze the effect
of data characteristics on the efficiency of two currently proposed privacy-preserving methods
for the AMI: anonymization and usage of pseudonyms. Here, we identify and investigate three
main characteristics of AMI data: the granularity of the data reported, its timespan and the
number of pseudonyms used for reporting these data. Based on our results we provide practical
means to tune these characteristics in order to enhance the efficiency and strengthen the resilience
under adversarial hindrance of the two AMI data privacy-enhancing technologies under study.
Our methodology can be employed by AMI data custodians to better understand the utility and
the properties of their datasets and provides a stepping stone for developing and testing privacy-
preserving release methods.
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Without losing RQ1 from sight, we focus on RQ2 by investigating how to improve the
utility of AMI data that undergoes privacy-enhancing technologies based on noise addition, such
as differential privacy. Here we propose methods that can be used to tune the quantity of noise
added in real-world AMI applications which employ differentially private aggregation. Based
on our investigation, we demonstrate the complementary protection offered by differentially
private aggregation when combined with other privacy-enhancing technologies, complementing
our study on RQ1. In a particular example, we validate with the help of an adversarial scenario
that the effect of de-anonymization can be mitigated if AMI data is aggregated in a differentially
private fashion.
Moving onwards with RQ2, we propose a methodology which can be employed to analyze
the different sources of information present in datasets which can benefit Advanced Metering
Infrastructure applications. We focus on sources of information which can be privacy enhanced
with the help of differentially private aggregation and we evaluate the effect of this enhancement
on the applications’ efficiency. We apply this methodology on an energy consumption prediction
technique and our results show that, with proper tuning, the noise introduced by the differentially
private aggregation has a negligible effect on the accuracy of the prediction. This opens the path
for further possible applications’ extension which enable extended use of data collected in AMI
in a privacy-preserving fashion.
Orthogonal to RQ1 and RQ2, we continue with RQ3 and we investigate how to balance the
need for confidentiality with the need to monitor the Advanced Metering Infrastructure commu-
nication network. We propose a methodology for an encrypted command recognition compo-
nent, based on side-channel information, which can be used in an Intrusion Detection System
for the AMI. Our results show that statistical information extracted from network traffic can be
used to correctly identify AMI commands, even when they are sent over an encrypted channel or
embedded in a protocol that is hard to parse. This is especially useful in environments where the
network operator employs encrypted traffic, both for security reasons and for customers’ privacy.
Our proposed solution can successfully complement already existing monitoring techniques or
it can be employed as a command recognition component in future developing ones.
Throughout this thesis, by harnessing the information contained in the large AMI data col-
lected, we show how the security and the privacy of the entities can be enhanced, we pose and
answer new questions, we validate previous findings, and we provide means to aid further ex-
tensions of this work. One important outcome of the exploratory work presented in this thesis
is that it can complement the Article 35 regarding Privacy by Design, of the EU General Data
Protection Regulation, for implementing Privacy Enhancing Technologies in the smart grid do-
main. Furthermore, our findings can be extended to other similar large scale Internet of Things
deployments such as sensor and vehicular networks which share many common characteristics
through the large data produced by similar IoT components.
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Future research directions
The work presented in this thesis advances the current state of the research regarding privacy and
security issues in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure. Based on the knowledge and technical
resources available we have provided thorough answers to the research questions presented at
the beginning of this chapter. Furthermore, our work stands as a starting point to further extend
some of these answers while also identifying a number of new challenges. We briefly present
these open challenges with respect to the research questions considered.
RQ1: In our first research question we have addressed the influence of Advanced Metering
Infrastructure datasets’ characteristics on the efficiency of privacy-enhancing technologies. One
direction for future work is extending and improving the adversarial model in order to explore her
full range of capabilities in performing de-anonymization and de-pseudonymization. Another
research direction is to analytically bound the success rate of the adversary with respect to the
characteristics of the targeted dataset. These will give a better understanding of the adversary
while offering privacy-preserving options for releasing and processing AMI datasets.
RQ2: In our second research question we have focused on enhancing the utility of data
that undergo privacy-enhancing technologies based on noise addition. Our study is focused
on differential privacy and it can be extended by considering other distributions for the noise
addition process and studying their effect on the utility of the data. Our study on short-term load
forecasting applications employing noisy aggregated data can be extended to cover also other
Advanced Metering Infrastructure applications in order to examine the benefits and possible
limitations of privacy-enhancing based on noise addition. This will help in improving current
and further developing applications based on AMI data.
RQ3: Finally, to answer the last research question we have investigated the possibility
to balance the need for confidentiality and customers’ data privacy with the need to monitor
the communication network. In our study we have considered two protocols currently used
in EU Advanced Metering Infrastructure deployments. Two limitations of our study are the
classification method used and the number of commands considered. Our classifier is based on
the k-nearest-neighbor algorithm, with a complexity linear in the size of the learning set. Other
classification algorithms also need to be considered in order to obtain a good performance on the
limited capabilities hardware installed in the AMI, especially in the case of protocols comprising
a large set of commands. We have taken into consideration commands available in the current
implementation of the studied protocols, and in the future our solution can be easily extended by
considering larger datasets comprising of multiple commands.
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